Based on the statistical property of quantum measurements instead of quantum bit commitment (QBC), a novel quantum oblivious transfer protocol is proposed. Its unconditional security is proven. The distinct merit of the present protocol lies in that it is independent of QBC, and thus its security is not restricted by the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem of unconditionally secure QBC.
The research on the oblivious transfer (OT) problem may be traced back to the work of Rabin reported more than twenty years ago [1] . Kilian [2] showed later that OT can be used to implement two-party secure computation [3] , which leads OT to be a promising protocol in cryptography. However, the security of classical cryptography usually has to be based on some strong computational assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring. If quantum computers become practical in the future, the validity of these assumptions can be broken easily [4] . Therefore, since the well-known quantum key distribution protocol [5] [6] [7] started the break-through in quantum cryptography, significant interests have been paid to look for quantum methods applicable to cryptography to achieve better security. As shown by Yao [8] , if there exists a secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) scheme, a secure quantum oblivious transfer scheme can then be implemented based upon the QBC. Nevertheless, it was found later by Mayers, Lo and Chau that all the QBC protocols formerly proposed [5, 9] are insecure. Furthermore, it was concluded that unconditionally secure QBC scheme can never be achieved in principle [10, 11] , which is referred to as the Mayers-Lo-Chau (MLC) no-go theorem and put a serious drawback on quantum cryptography. According to the theorem, all QBC related protocols are insecure, including quantum coin tossing [5, [12] [13] [14] and quantum oblivious mutual identification [15] . Previously proposed quantum OT protocols [16] [17] [18] are not secure either, since they are all based on QBC. In addition, even if we establish quantum OT protocols based on computationally secure using classical bit commitment instead of QBC, they will be reduced to computational secure protocols, and show no advantage over their classical counterparts.
On the other hand, it is not required in principle that quantum OT must be implemented with bit commitment. Therefore, it is nature to ask whether we can design and implement a quantum OT protocol with unconditional security. Clearly, this kind of protocol differs from those based on QBC proposed previously and is of significance in cryptography. In this Letter, a novel but simple quantum OT protocol is proposed, whose security does not rely on that of the QBC protocol and thus can be unconditionally secure. Besides, since previous quantum OT protocols have to involve a single QBC process for each qubit transmitted between the participants, even if there exists a secure QBC protocol, the total number of qubits involved is in the order of magnitude of n×n ′ (here n and n ′ are the security numbers of the OT protocol and the QBC protocol respectively); while the new protocol proposed here will merely involve n qubits.
Although there are various types of OT, as a typical illustration, we here focus only on one basic type studied in Refs. [1, 8] . A sender called Alice wants to transfer a secret bit b (b ∈ {0, 1}) to a receiver called Bob. At the end of the protocol, either Bob could learn the value of b correctly, or he gains only little information about b. Each possibility should occur with probability 1/2, and which one happens finally is out of their control. Meanwhile, Alice should learn nothing about which event takes place. If the probability for either participant to cheat is exponentially small as the security number n increases, the protocol is called unconditionally secure. When speak of cheating, we mean that Alice wants to learn a nontrivial information about which event takes place, or Bob wants to have a sure-win strategy that can enable him to learn the value of b with the probability higher than 1/2.
Let us first review briefly why the existing quantum OT protocols cannot be unconditionally secure. Consider an ideal case, in which no transmission error occurs. Let |0 + and |1 + denote the two orthogonal states of a 2-level quantum system, where + stands for the rectilinear basis. Define
, where × stands for the diagonal basis. According to Refs. [3, 8] , existing quantum OT protocols can be summarized as follows.
Alice randomly picks bits r i ∈ {0, 1}, θ i ∈ {+, ×} and sends Bob a qubit |r i θ i ;
Bob randomly picks a bit θ (1d) Alice announces the bases θ 1 θ 2 ...θ n . Bob randomly chooses two subsets I 0 , I 1 ⊆ {1, ..., n} − R, subject to the conditions that I 0 and I 1 share no common elements and
should also reach a certain number, so that there are no enough qubits that can satisfy θ i = θ ′ i for any i ∈ I 1 at the same time [3, 8] . Then he announces {I 0 , I 1 } in random order to Alice; (1e) Alice picks a random bit s ∈ {0, 1}, and sends s and Note that, to prevent Bob from cheating, the bit commitment process is involved in step (1c). If this step is removed, Bob can cheat as follows. In step (1b) he does not measure any of the qubits but stores them up. After Alice announces the correct base θ 1 θ 2 ...θ n in the beginning of step (1d), Bob measures each qubit in θ i . As a result, the number of qubits that satisfy θ i = θ ′ i is almost doubled in comparison with that in the honest protocol, such that all the qubits in I 0 and I 1 satisfy θ i = θ ′ i . Therefore, in step (1e) Bob can always compute b correctly, regardless of the value of s picked by Alice.
However, according to the MLC theorem [10, 11] , Bob can always cheat in any bit commitment process by using the coherent attack. That is, even if step (1c) is included in the OT protocol, Bob is still not forced to complete all measurement in step (1b). He can make his commitment in step (1c) by guess. After Alice tells him R, Bob measures the qubits in R only, letting him past the test successfully. While for the other qubits, he can still store them until Alice announces the base θ 1 θ 2 ...θ n in step (1d). Thus the cheating strategy mentioned in the previous paragraph is still valid for Bob. All in all, an OT protocol can not be more secure than the bit commitment as long as the former is based on the latter.
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the cheating severity of OT is significantly weaker than that of QBC. In bit commitment, when speak of cheating, both participants can be extremely malevolent. The sender intends to make empty commitment and will be able to alter the value of the committed bit later, while the receiver wants to know the bit before he should. On the other hand, for oblivious transfer, it is generally assumed that the sender Alice is not too malevolent. She needs to be honest when providing the transferred bit. Otherwise the protocol surely cannot be carried on because Bob receives only garbage information provided by her. Therefore, when speak of Alice's cheating, we only mean that she is trying to know whether or not Bob has received the transferred bit correctly; whether she can alter the value of the bit is not concerned with here. More clearly, it is not necessary to establish secure OT protocols based solely on QBC, which puts actually more restrictions on the participants and thus may lead to some extra obstruction on the security.
We now design a quantum OT protocol without involving bit commitment. Let us consider the case that Alice transfers a classical string r = r 1 r 2 ...r n by sending Bob a series of qubits in the state |r θ = |r 1 θ |r 2 θ ... |r n θ , where n is known by Bob. θ ∈ {+, ×} is chosen to be the same for all qubits. Bob randomly picks a basis θ ′ ∈ {+, ×} to measure all these qubits and records the result as r ′
is measured in the × (+) basis, either case 0 or 1 can occur with the equal probability, and no one can predict which case will really occur. So if Bob knows the weight w(r) (i.e. the total number of "1" in the string) of r, he has a chance to be able to check whether θ ′ is the correct basis from w(r ′ ): w(r ′ ) = w(r) when θ ′ = θ; when θ ′ = θ, w(r ′ ) is determined by the statistical property of quantum measurements and w(r ′ ) and w(r) are not always equal to each other due to the fluctuations. But once again, Alice should not tell Bob w(r) explicitly. Instead, she sends him another series of qubits |r θ = |r 1 θ |r 2 θ ... |r n θ . The content of the stringr =r 1r2 ...r n needs not to be related with r, and the only requirement is that w(r) = w(r). If Bob measures both |r θ and |r θ in the correct basis, he certainly obtains w(r ′ ) = w(r ′ ). Herer ′ is the result of his measurement on |r θ . If Bob finds w(r ′ ) = w(r ′ ), he immediately knows that the basis he used is the wrong one. In this case, he could not know the correct content of r andr, since their quantum states are already measured and disturbed. To conclude, we put forward the following naive OT protocol.
Protocol 2: Naive Protocol (2a) Alice randomly picks a bit θ ∈ {+, ×} and two strings r = r 1 r 2 ...r n/2 ∈ {0, 1} n/2 andr =r 1r2 ...r n/2 ∈ {0, 1} n/2 with w(r) = w(r). Then she sends Bob n qubits in the states |r θ = |r 1 θ |r 2 θ ... r n/2 θ and |r θ = |r 1 θ |r 2 θ ... r n/2 θ through the quantum channel; (2b) Alice chooses a non-zero random n-bit string s = (s 1 s 2 ...s n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and a Boolean matrix G as the generating matrix of a binary linear (n, k, d)-code C [9] . When the bit she wants to transfer is b, she chooses a random n-bit codeword c = (c 1 c 2 ...c n ) from C such that The purpose of step (2b) is to set up a mapping from the string rr ′ to the bit b. Here k × n is the size of G, and d is the minimum distance between the codewords in C, which can be chosen as 1 in this protocol. (Details of the mathematical characteristics of such a binary linear code can be found in Ref. [9] .) Unlike step (1e) in the old protocol, we do not map the parity of the weight (odd or even) of the string rr directly into b. The reason for this consideration is as follows. Since w(r) = w(r), the two strings r andr have the same parity. If Alice sets b s = b i∈{1,...,n/2} r i i∈{1,...,n/2}r i as she did in the old protocol, Bob can compute the value of b even if he knows the parity of one of the strings only. That is, Alice has sent redundant information on b that may potentially increase Bob's chance to cheat successfully.
It is obvious that Protocol 2 is perfectly secure against Alice. In this protocol, only the one-way communication from Alice to Bob is involved as Bob never sends out anything. If Alice has a method to learn any non-trivial information on whether Bob has decoded the value of b successfully, a superluminal signal transferred from Bob to Alice is realized, which conflicts with the principle of special theory of relativity and thus is impossible.
The security against Bob can be justified below. (i) Its security does not depend on the security of bit commitment. Alice's action does not depend on any commitment of Bob, so there is no need to concerned with the MLC no-go theorem of quantum bit commitment; (ii) It is unconditionally secure against individual measurements. When Bob picks the basis θ ′ and measures the qubits one by one, he has 1/2 chance to be right or wrong. If he is right, he can surely recover rr from r ′r′ successfully and compute b. If he uses the wrong basis to measure even few qubits, their quantum states will be disturbed and Bob cannot know what results should have been if the qubits were measured in the other basis. In this case, since the number of possible codewords is exponentially large as k increases, the probability for Bob to compute b correctly is exponentially small; (iii) It is also secure against coherent measurements. Using coherent attacks, Bob indeed can get some integral information on the string rr. However, he does not know whether this information is useful or not for computing b. This is because this kind of information is encoded by the comparison between the weights of the strings r andr. To know these weights, Bob needs to know exactly the result for each qubit measured in the correct basis. Therefore he has to go back to individual measurements again. Consequently, coherent measurements can give no further advantages to a dishonest Bob in this protocol. More specifically, the inexistence of the sure-win coherent attack strategy can be proven: supposing that such a strategy exists, which enables Bob to cheat for any value of n, it surely covers the n = 2 case as well. In this case, to satisfy w(r) = w(r), the state |r θ |r θ has four possible choices: |0 + |0 + , |0 × |0 × , |1 + |1 + and |1 × |1 × . To learn the value of b, Bob needs to distinguish (
That is, the states have 1/2 probability to be indistinguishable. Therefore, Bob's best chance to learn the correct value of b is the same as that in the honest protocol, and thus the coherent attack is not expected to be successful for an even larger n.
Nevertheless, the protocol is called "naive" because there may exist a misleading situation for an honest Bob. Even if he uses the wrong basis to measure all the qubits, he may be so unlucky that w(r ′ ) = w(r ′ ) accidently. In this accident case, although r ′r′ has no relationship with rr, Bob may misunderstand that the basis he used was the right one and thus thinks that the value of b he computed is correct. Because of this, protocol 2 cannot be regarded to be secure though it can prevent Alice and Bob from cheating. Since this misleading situation only occurs with the probability smaller than 1, if ever the strings r andr are divided into many groups, and the condition w(r) = w(r) is required to be valid for every group, the probability for the misleading situation to occur simultaneously in all groups is exponentially small as the number of groups increases. In short, we design the following complete form of the secure protocol.
Protocol 3: Secure Protocol (3a) Alice randomly picks a bit θ ∈ {+, ×} and 2m strings r (j) = r
n/2m ∈ {0, 1} n/2m with w(r (j) ) = w(r (j) ) (j = 1, ..., m).
Then she sends Bob n qubits in the states r
... r and r
The exact probability for the misleading situation to occur in this protocol can be estimated in the following way. For any j, r (j) θ contains n/2m qubits. When measured with the wrong basis, the probabilities for each qubit found to be in state 0 and 1 are both 1/2. Therefore, the probability for w(r (j) ) to be equal to a certain number k ∈ {0, n/2m} is Pr(w(r
Thus the probability for r (j) andr (j) to have the same weight is Pr(w(r (j) ) = w(r [ n/2m k /(2 n/2m )] 2 } m , which drops exponentially to zero as m increases while n/2m is fixed. The security against Alice is maintained for the same reason as mentioned before. But for Bob, since more equations w(r (j) ) = w(r (j) ) (j = 1, ..., m) are provided, he can know more information on the string (r (1)r(1) r (2)r(2) ...r (m)r(m) ) than he did in protocol 2. For instance, if he has just completed measurements on r immediately finds w(r ′(1) ) = w(r ′(1) ), he knows that θ ′ is the wrong basis. So he can measure the rest qubits in the other basis and learn the rest of the string r (2)r(2) ...r (m)r(m) correctly. Thus the protocol remains secure only when Alice chooses d < n/2m. This is important, especially for modifying the protocol in a fault-tolerant way because the transmission error in the quantum channel cannot be completely ignored practically, and thus d = 1 as we set in protocol 2 is not always the case.
To conclude, a novel quantum oblivious transfer protocol has been proposed, which does not depend on bit commitment. Most importantly, the protocol's unconditional security was proven, and thus makes it possible to implement two-party secure computation protocols.
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